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ABSTRACT 
 
 The introduction of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) into the 
transportation system will provide both opportunities and challenges for those who 
own the vehicles and power systems operators.   
The opportunities come in the form of the ability to provide vehicle-to-grid 
(V2G) services including peak load reduction and frequency regulation.  Utilizing 
these services can provide profits for the vehicle owners, cost savings for the grid 
operators, and reduced air pollution.  The primary goal of this study is to analyze these 
benefits from the viewpoint of the individual vehicle owner.  It is found that there is 
little financial incentive when V2G services are used for peak reduction.  There is 
much greater potential for financial return when V2G services are used to provide 
frequency regulation, likely enough to incentivize many people to participate in such a 
program.  Proposed in this paper is a system that combines these V2G services into a 
single program, which could have the effect of ensuring profits for the individual, 
while still providing cost-saving opportunities for grid operators, and emission 
reductions during the times when it is needed most. 
In addition to the opportunities brought about by increased penetration of 
PHEVs, there are challenges as well.  This comes mainly in the form of increased 
demand for electricity.  The possible effects on electricity load of increased PHEV 
penetration and V2G participation are analyzed in this paper. Furthermore, an 
econometric model is used to predict the effect of increased electricity load on 
electricity price at each hour of the day.   It is found that increased PHEV penetration 
can (in a regulated charging scheme) increase electricity loads and prices during the 
hours when electricity loads and prices are currently lowest.  Furthermore, if V2G 
technology is used for peak reduction, electricity loads and prices can be reduced 
  
during peak electricity demand hours.  The overall effect of this is a flattening of the 
daily electricity load and price profiles, which is likely to be beneficial for power 
system operators.  The flattening of the daily electricity price profile has the effect of 
reducing profits when V2G technology is used for peak reduction because it raises the 
price during charging (buying electricity) and lowers the price during discharging 
(selling electricity). 
While the analysis presented here works within the framework of the current 
electricity markets, it is possible that the best use for V2G technology could come in a 
program that allows grid operators to dispatch the stored energy for the optimal 
purpose (e.g.: peak reduction, regulation, reserves, ramping) at any period of time.  
This would require a different type of market structure, possibly even a separate 
market for storage, in which V2G services could participate.
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CHAPTER 1 
Using Vehicle-to-Grid Technology for Peak Load Reduction and Regulation in the 
New York Metropolitan Area 
Introduction 
 
Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEVs) are the next stage of evolution for 
today’s hybrid car models. PHEV technology expands on the current generation of 
hybrid vehicles by allowing the vehicle to charge its battery while stationary using the 
electricity grid. A PHEV can be operated using only the electric motor for several 
miles, so that the combustion engine does not even turn on for short trips. Widespread 
PHEV (and Full-Electric Vehicle) use will have substantial effects on electricity use 
and the electric grid, offering both challenges and potential opportunities for both 
PHEV owners and grid operators. 
While PHEV use will certainly increase the overall electricity load, it offers the 
potential to act as a distributed storage device and can provide several vehicle-to-grid 
(V2G) services.  The focus of this paper will be on two of these V2G services: peak 
shifting and ancillary services. As peak shifting devices, PHEV batteries may be 
charged in periods of low electricity demand (and thus low prices) and discharged 
during high demand (and high price) periods.  Not only can the PHEV owners make a 
profit by buying energy when the cost is low and selling when the price is high, but 
doing this can have the effect of decreasing the use of low-efficiency, high-emission 
peaking units. “Ancillary services” is a more broad term, which can refer to services 
provided to the electric grid such as frequency regulation or electric reserves.  While 
there is certainly potential for V2G technology to be used as  reserves (spinning 
reserves in particular), the focus of this paper is on frequency regulation, which refers 
to the adjustments to electricity supply (both up and down) that power system 
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operators must make in order to balance electricity supply and demand in real-time. In 
this paper, the potential profits to PHEV owners who participate in a program that uses 
V2G for peak shifting are compared with the potential profits to PHEV owners who 
participate in a program that uses V2G technology for frequency regulation. 
There has been previous research in each of these areas.  Several recent papers 
have shown that there is the potential for significant economic return for using V2G as 
a frequency regulation provider (Tomic & Kempton, 2007; Quinn, Zimmerle, & 
Bradley, 2010; Ramteen & Denholm, 2009). Additionally, another recent paper shows 
that there is very little return for PHEV owners if they were to use V2G exclusively 
for peak load reduction (Peterson, Whitacre, & Apt, 2010a).   These are similar to the 
findings presented here.  While it is important to analyze these separately, it is shown 
in this paper that these two uses for V2G technology are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. It is proposed here that V2G technology can be used for frequency 
regulation on a daily basis, and additionally be used for peak load reduction during 
times of extremely high electricity demand and poor ambient air quality.  This 
framework ensures that drivers experience sufficient economic return for their 
participation in the V2G service, and simultaneously provides environmental benefits 
during the times in which it is needed most.  Additionally, it is possible in certain 
scenarios that this dual-use V2G service could actually provide higher profits to the 
participants than either of the single-use V2G programs on their own. 
In order to get to the analysis of the dual-use V2G service that is proposed 
here, the two single-use V2G programs area analyzed individually.  For the analyses 
that follow, a set of general assumptions is required.  Firstly, it is assumed that all of 
the V2G participants are aggregated into a single controllable power resource as 
described in (Quinn, Zimmerle, & Bradley, 2010). Though it is recognized that it 
would be necessary for the aggregator to earn some percentage of the profits, no 
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specific assumptions are made about the amount of profits they would earn; instead, 
the total profits that would accrue to the individual before any percentage of that is 
taken by the aggregator are presented.  Furthermore, the specifications of the 
upcoming Chevrolet Volt is used as a basis for the analysis to follow.  The Volt has a 
16 kWh lithium-ion battery that uses a 50% depth-of-discharge; meaning only 8 kWh 
of the energy on the battery is available for both driving and any V2G use.  The 8 kWh 
of the battery charges fully in approximately six hours, which implies a charge rate of 
approximately 1.33kW, given the assumption of a constant charge rate.  The full-
electric range of the vehicle is 40 miles, meaning the vehicle can drive 5 miles per 
kWh (2011 Volt, 2010).  Finally, for much of the economic analysis, it is assumed that 
the aggregated V2G service is a price taker, having no significant effect electricity 
loads or prices.  This assumption is essentially the same as assuming there is a very 
low rate of participation in the V2G program.  This assumption will be relaxed in 
Chapter III, where the impacts of high participation rates are discussed 
 
V2G for Peak Reduction 
 
Calculating the amount of peak load that can be reduced through V2G, as well 
as calculating the profits available to the individual requires specifying the amount of 
energy that each vehicle will be able to sell to the grid.  The National Household 
Transportation Survey (USDOT, 2002) provides data on the average number of miles 
driven per day by a sample New York residents.  Using this data, the percentage of 
individuals who fit into each of five groups depending on the average number of miles 
driven per day is calculated.  It is assumed that every member of each of these groups 
drives the average number of miles driven by that group, and that any electricity not 
spent on driving is available for V2G.  The percentage of individuals that exist in each 
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of these groups as well as the available electricity left on the vehicles in each of these 
groups are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Description of Driver Groups 
Driver Group Percentage of Drivers Within 
Each Range 
Average 
Number of Miles 
Available kWh 
per Vehicle 
0 – 10 Miles 22.18 % 4.38 7.124 
10 – 20 Miles 20.31 % 14.84 5.031 
20 – 30 Miles 20.71 % 25.33 2.934 
30 – 40 Miles 13.95 % 33.61 1.278 
40+ Miles 22.86 % 59.39 0 
 
 The groups of drivers presented in Table 1 will be referred to several times 
throughout the paper, as the potential profits for the drivers who exist in each of these 
groups are calculated.  As expected, the individuals who are part of the higher mileage 
groups, and thus have the least spare energy to sell to the grid, will receive the least 
profits.  Left out of the rest of the analysis are those individuals who average more 
than 40 miles per day and thus are not able to participate in a V2G program.   
In 2006, the New York City Department of Transportation estimated that there 
are approximately 1,130,002 commuters into New York City on a daily basis (Sadik-
Khan, 2007).  Using this figure, and those presented in Table 1, the potential that V2G 
technology has for reducing peak electricity load in New York City can be calculated.  
With 1% of all New York City commuters participating in the program, there is about 
38.28MWh of available power.  The relationship between participation rate and the 
amount of power available is linear, such that with 10% of all commuters 
participating, there is approximately 382.8MWh of available power, and so on. To 
reiterate what was said earlier, a low participation rate is used for much of the analysis 
to follow so that there is no effect of changes in electricity load on prices.  The 
implications that result from high participation scenarios will be discussed in Chapter 
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III.  To describe the potential profits for participating in a V2G program that is solely 
used for peak reduction, refer to Equation 1. 
 
Equation 1: Profits under V2G for Peak Reduction 
                        
Where: 
  : The total annual profits from V2G participation 
    : The total annual revenue gained from the energy market 
   : The total annual revenue gained from the capacity market 
   : The annualized fixed cost of upgrading a vehicle to V2G-capability 
    : The annual cost of purchasing energy that will be sold back to the grid 
   : The annual cost of battery degradation 
 
 Note that each of these costs and revenues are calculated as they apply to the 
amount of electricity sold to the grid by each vehicle as described in Table 1.  
Referring back to Equation 1,     and     can be viewed in tandem, as they are 
calculated in a similar manner. Hour-ahead Locational-Based Marginal Pricing 
(LBMP) data from the New York ISO for the New York City region in the years of 
2007, 2008, and 2009 is used to come up with the estimates presented here (NYISO, 
2009a).  In the calculations of    , it is assumed that electricity will be discharged 
while people are at work, since these are the hours that generally experience the 
highest electricity loads and prices.  To calculate    , the maximum electricity price 
for each work day is multiplied by the amount of electricity that is available to be sold 
to the grid, and then summed up over the year.  To determine    , the vehicles are 
assumed to be charged during the six hours of the night that generally have the lowest 
electricity prices (12AM through 5AM).  The average price over these six hours is 
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defined as the charging price for each day.  Thus, the annual cost of energy is the 
amount of spare electricity on each vehicle multiplied by the charging price at each 
day, and then summed over the year.  The energy revenues, energy costs, as well as 
the difference between these (energy arbitrage profits) are presented in Tables 2-4.  
Note that energy arbitrage profits simply refer to (         , the total profits for the 
V2G-for-peak reduction program are shown in Table 6. 
 In this analysis, it is assumed that the aggregated V2G service is essentially 
being compensated as if it were a power generator. Because of this, the V2G 
participants should be eligible for a capacity payment just as power generators are.  
Because the V2G service is acting as a peaking generator, (only supplying energy 
during the hours of highest demand) one would think that like a peaking generator, the 
capacity payment would make up the majority of their profits, and this is indeed what 
is found.  The problem, however, lies in defining the capacity of a PHEV; capacity for 
power generators is defined as the maximum amount of power that they can generate, 
and that amount of power can be generated for an indefinite period of time.  This is 
not the case for PHEV batteries, however, which can produce various amounts of 
power, but for only as long as the battery lasts.  For this reason, the capacity of the 
aggregated V2G service is defined as the amount of electricity load that the V2G 
service has the ability to reduce (without causing the load at the peak to actually dip 
below that of its surrounding hours). 
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Figure 1: Unadjusted and reduced-peak load with 10% total V2G participation 
on 1/05/09 (NYISO, 2009b). 
 
Figure 1 shows the difference between the unadjusted load and the reduced 
peak load with 10% total V2G participation (10% of all commuters participate in the 
V2G program). The way the capacity payment in the V2G program is defined here, it 
is the distance between the top of the unadjusted peak and the reduced peak at the 
same hour. Because hourly load data and low participation rates (lower than 10%) are 
assumed, the capacity (in kW) for each vehicle can simply be defined as the same 
number of available kWh that is left on the battery.  Note that this would not be the 
case in higher participation scenarios (such as in Figure 2), where the period of peak 
reduction spans more than one hour.  As for the capacity payment itself, a value of 
$50,000/MW is used, which was approximately the capacity payment that generators 
received in 2008 (Patton, LeeVanShaick, & Chen, 2008); this value is used for all 
three years. 
 The remaining two parts of Equation 1 are    and   . For   , a value of $90 
per year is used, as in (Tomic & Kempton, 2007).  Though the referenced paper 
focused on using V2G for frequency regulation, the same technology would be 
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required to use V2G for peak reduction. To determine the cost of battery degradation, 
refer to Equation 2. 
 
Equation 2: Battery Degradation Costs 
   
      
          
 
Where: 
   : Total cost of a new battery 
   : Labor cost of battery replacement 
   : Battery lifetime in number of cycles at a certain depth of discharge 
  : Total battery energy capacity 
    : Depth of discharge used in    
 
 Note that in this equation,    is the cost of battery degradation in $ per kWh of 
throughput, which allows for easier interpretation in this type of analysis than would a 
measure of cost per battery cycle.  In Equation 2,    is the total cost of a new battery; 
this is set to $300/kWh, which is the target cost for 2015 set by the U.S. Advanced 
Battery Consortium (Voelcker, 2007).  This number is multiplied by the 16kWh total 
battery capacity to determine the total cost of a new battery, equal to $4800.    is the 
labor cost of replacing the battery, which is set to$240 (8 hours at $30/hour); this may 
be somewhat of an overestimate, but it is consistent with the previous literature 
(Tomic & Kempton, 2007).  In the denominator of Equation 2,    is the battery 
lifetime in cycles at a certain depth of discharge.  A recent study of the performance of 
PHEV batteries showed that it took 5300 cycles at 95% depth of discharge before the 
battery reached 80% of its original capacity (this is the level at which it is 
recommended to replace the battery) (Peterson, Apt, & Whitacre, 2010b).  
Unfortunately, data was not available for the number of cycles at 50% depth of 
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discharge, which is the depth-of-discharge employed by the Chevrolet Volt.  Given the 
non-linear relationship between battery lifetime and depth of discharge, using the 
battery cycle lifetime of 5300 cycles is likely somewhat of a conservative estimate (a 
higher number is likely the case).  In terms of the equation above,    is set to 5300 
cycles and     is set to 95%.  , which is the total energy in kWh on the battery is set 
to 16kWh.  Solving Equation 2, the cost of battery degradation is estimated to be 
approximately 6.45¢ per kWh of throughput.  Shown in Table 5 are the capacity 
payments and battery degradation costs associated with each driver group (these 
figures are used for all three years). Finally, the total annual profits for an individual 
participating in a program that uses V2G exclusively for peak reduction every day of 
the year are shown in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 2: Energy Revenues, Energy Costs, and Energy Arbitrage Profits (2007) 
Driver Group Energy Revenues Energy Costs Arbitrage Profits 
0 – 10 Miles $364 $148 $216 
10 – 20 Miles $257 $104 $153 
20 – 30 Miles $150 $61 $89 
30 – 40 Miles $65 $27 $39 
 
Table 3: Energy Revenues, Energy Costs, and Energy Arbitrage Profits (2008) 
Driver Group Energy Revenues Energy Costs Arbitrage Profits 
0 – 10 Miles $347 $169 $178 
10 – 20 Miles $245 $119 $125 
20 – 30 Miles $143 $70 $73 
30 – 40 Miles $62 $30 $32 
 
Table 4: Energy Revenues, Energy Costs, and Energy Arbitrage Profits (2009) 
Driver Group Energy Revenues Energy Costs Arbitrage Profits 
0 – 10 Miles $212 $87 $125 
10 – 20 Miles $150 $61 $89 
20 – 30 Miles $87 $36 $52 
30 – 40 Miles $38 $16 $22 
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Table 5: Capacity Payments and Battery Degradation Costs 
Driver Group Capacity Payment Battery Degradation Costs Fixed Cost 
0 – 10 Miles $356 $163 $90 
10 – 20 Miles $252 $115 $90 
20 – 30 Miles $147 $67 $90 
30 – 40 Miles $64 $29 $90 
 
Table 6: Annual Profits in 2007, 2008, and 2009 – V2G for Peak Reduction 
Driver Group 2007  Profits 2008 Profits 2009 Profits 
0 – 10 Miles $319 $281 $229 
10 – 20 Miles $199 $172 $135 
20 – 30 Miles $79 $63 $41 
30 – 40 Miles -$17 -$23 -$33 
 
Notice in Table 6 that the individuals who exist in the group who drive the 
most (and therefore have the least energy to sell to the grid) actually incur negative 
profits.  The energy costs and battery degradation costs for this group are very low, 
since they are not contributing much energy to the grid.  The primary reason for the 
negative profits is the fixed capital cost of $90 that is applied to every group of 
drivers.  The differences in profits through these three years are not surprising 
considering energy prices were at record highs in 2007 and early 2008, then fell 
considerably with the recession in late 2008.  Even with the highest profit figures that 
are estimated here, it is unlikely that these profits would encourage many individuals 
to participate in this type of V2G program.  In the next section, it is shown that it is far 
more profitable from the standpoint of the individual to use V2G technology for 
frequency regulation 
 
V2G for Frequency Regulation 
 
To determine the revenue that could be earned by supplying frequency 
regulation, one must take into account both regulation up and regulation down.  It is 
assumed here that half of the time spent providing regulation is on regulation up, and 
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half is spent on regulation down.  Additionally, it is assumed that the rate of energy 
exchange for regulation up and regulation down is equal, which implies that the net 
change in charge of each battery is zero.  At the end of any given regulation session, 
the battery may end up with a charge that is slightly below or slightly above the charge 
that was left on the battery at the beginning of the session, but in the long run, the net 
change in charge will approach zero. Additionally, given a V2G-for-regulation 
program that is aggregated over many vehicles, the difference would likely be too 
small to cause a significant impact on any individual driver.  In order to describe the 
revenues associated with using V2G for regulation, refer to Equation 3, which is a 
modified version of the equations used in the previous literature (Tomic & Kempton, 
2007; Quinn, Zimmerle, & Bradley, 2010). 
 
Equation 3: Revenues under V2G for Regulation 
               
 
 
             
Where: 
     : Hourly revenue gained from providing regulation through V2G 
     : Price of regulation at the specified hour 
  : Power rating of the vehicle 
    : Price of electricity at the specified hour 
     : Ratio of contracted power to contracted time during regulation-up 
 
 In some energy markets, different prices are given for regulation up and 
regulation down; in the market in New York, however, only one price for regulation is 
given.   For this reason, only one equation describing the revenues from regulation is 
required.  The first term in Equation 3 describes the hourly revenue gained through the 
regulation market.  The second term in the equation describes the revenue gained 
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through selling small amounts of electricity to the grid while providing regulation-up.  
Note that in the previous literature, the same basic formula is used to describe 
regulation-up, but it is accompanied by another equation for regulation down.   Using 
only one equation and one price for regulation and applying the assumption that half 
of the contracted time is spent on regulation-up and half on regulation-down, it is 
necessary to divide the second term in Equation 3 by two. 
 In terms of conducting the analysis, Equation 3 is applied to each hour of the 
day during the three years included in the analysis, and then summed over the year. 
The data used for the regulation prices is the hour-ahead regulation prices for the East 
region in New York State taken from the NYISO (NYISO, 2009c).  The power rating 
of the vehicle that is chosen is crucial in determining the overall profits from using 
V2G for regulation.  This analysis is conducted for two different power ratings; the 
first being equal to the actual charge rate of the Chevrolet Volt of 1.33kW.  In the 
context of a PHEV, providing regulation-down is the same as charging the vehicle, 
and thus the capacity for providing regulation-down is limited by the charge rate of the 
vehicle.  For the purposes of simplification, the assumption that this limitation extends 
to regulation-up as well is made.  Also presented are results for a charge rate of 10kW, 
as in (Quinn, Zimmerle, & Bradley, 2010), which implicitly assumes that faster 
charging technology will be available by the time V2G technology is ready for 
deployment. The electricity prices that are used here are the same LBMPs that were 
used in the previous section.  Finally, the      term is set equal to 0.10, as in the 
previous literature; this implies that the regulation provider is actively selling energy 
to the grid (at their full regulation capacity) for 10% of the time during which they are 
contracted for regulation-up (Tomic & Kempton, 2007; Quinn, Zimmerle, & Bradley, 
2010). Because the NYISO has only a single market for regulation (not markets for 
regulation up and down), the second term in Equation 3 is divided by two such that 
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5% of the total contracted time for regulation is spent actively selling energy to the 
grid at the full regulation capacity. 
 Furthermore, to more accurately estimate annual revenues, an hourly measure 
of vehicle availability is required. To do this, data from the Regional Travel – 
Household Interview Survey (RT-HIS) in the New York Metropolitan Area is used to 
determine the percentage of commuter vehicles that are parked and available for V2G 
at each hour (NYDOT, 2000).  The RT-HIS provides data on the percentage of 
commuters going to and from work at each hour. Using the assumption that each 
commuter that is going to work then spends eight hours working, and the assumption 
that all individuals are either commuting (not available) or are parked at work or home 
(available), an approximate measure of the percentage of individuals who are parked 
either at work or at home (and are presumably available for V2G) at each hour can be 
computed.  Although this does not provide an actual driving pattern of any real 
individual, it provides a measure of vehicle availability for an “average” individual. 
The minimum availability is approximately 77.9% at 6AM, and the maximum is 
approximately 99.8% at 1AM.  Over the 24 hour period, the availabilities sum to 
approximately 22 hours. 
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Figure 2: Average hourly regulation prices for the East region in New York State 
in 2009 and hourly vehicle availability percentages 
 
Figure 2 helps to illustrate the motive behind using hourly vehicle availability; 
a measure for average hourly revenue could have been used here and simply been 
multiplied by 22 hours, but this would provide somewhat of an overestimate since the 
hours of lowest vehicle availability tend to coincide with the hours with the highest 
regulation prices.  On the other hand, if zero availability during the commuting hours 
and 100% availability during the remaining hours were assumed, this would result in 
an underestimate.  Additionally, it is likely that this effect will be exacerbated with 
higher penetrations of PHEVs: the load will be even more variable at the commuting 
hours, which should raise the price of regulation.  To determine the total annual 
revenue obtained through the V2G-for-regulation program, the hourly revenues 
described in Equation 3 are multiplied by the percentage of available vehicles at each 
hour, and then summed over the year. The annual revenue calculations for 2007, 2008, 
and 2009 as described in Equation 3 are shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Regulation Revenues (2007, 2008, and 2009) 
Power Rating Revenue (2007) Revenue (2008) Revenue (2009) 
10kW $4780 $4666 $3203 
1.33kW $637 $622 $427 
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The costs of participating in a program that uses V2G exclusively for 
frequency regulation are very similar to the costs of using V2G for peak reduction.  
The costs are separated into three categories: fixed capital costs, energy costs, and the 
cost of battery degradation.  Because the same basic technology is needed for the 
vehicle upgrade, the fixed costs are assumed to be exactly the same as they were in the 
previous section: $90 annually.  The energy cost associated with using V2G for 
regulation is the cost of purchasing energy that will later be sold to the grid while the 
vehicle is providing regulation-up.  Given the assumption of a net zero change in 
battery charge, however, the energy that is sold to the grid is exactly offset by the 
“free charging” experienced while providing regulation down; thus, the implied net 
cost of energy is zero.   
There are some uncertainties when estimating the costs of battery degradation 
specifically in the case of V2G for regulation.  The reason for this uncertainty is that 
the nature of regulation implies that the battery will experience repeated charging and 
discharging in rapid succession.  This may sound like it would degrade the battery, but 
the fact of the matter is that it has been shown that charging at a shallow depth of 
discharge can exponentially increase the cycle life of a battery (Peterson, Apt, & 
Whitacre, 2010b).  With such long cycle lives at such a shallow depth of discharge, 
one could make the case for very low or even zero cost of battery degradation.  A 
somewhat more conservative approach is taken here, however, and a scaling factor of 
three is used (the same assumption that has been employed by previous authors 
(Tomic & Kempton, 2007; Quinn, Zimmerle, & Bradley, 2010)).  This means that the 
shallow discharging results in three times the cycle life, and thus one third of the cost 
in dollars per kWh of throughput when compared with deep discharging.  The cost of 
battery degradation in this case is 2.01¢ per kWh of throughput.  Total annual vehicle 
throughput is calculated by using the vehicle availability percentages along with 
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       from Equation 3. The annual battery degradation costs for the 10kW and 
1.33kW scenarios are $167.46 and $22.33, respectively.  The battery degradation costs 
as well as the fixed cost of upgrading the vehicle are subtracted from the annual 
revenues to determine the total annual profits from participating in a program that uses 
V2G exclusively or regulation, these results are presented in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Annual Profits for 2007, 2008, and 2009 – V2G for Regulation 
Power Rating 2007 Profits 2008 Profits 2009 Profits 
10kW $4656 $4616 $2951 
1.33kW $543 $537 $316 
 
It is shown here that even with the least generous assumptions, the profits 
experienced while participating in a V2G-for-regulation program are greater than even 
the highest profits earned in a program that uses V2G for peak reduction in the same 
year.  Additionally, if a power rating of 10kW (or close to it) becomes possible with 
fast-charging technology, there is potential for V2G-for-regulation participants to 
experience extremely large profits.  In the next section, a combined V2G program is 
presented in way such that the higher profits that are realized by using V2G for 
regulation are kept intact, while still achieving some of the external benefits associated 
with peak reduction by only using V2G for peak reduction on the days when it is 
needed most. 
 
V2G for Peak Load Reduction and Regulation 
 
When it comes to using V2G technology for peak load reduction, there are 
limited financial incentives for the driver.  That being said, there is potential for 
significant external benefits if V2G is used for peak reduction during times of high 
electricity demand.  These external benefits come in the form of cost savings for the 
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grid operators, who may be able to decrease the use of expensive and inefficient 
generators.  Additionally, there may be significant environmental benefits that can be 
experienced.  Periods of high electricity demand typically happen during hot summer 
days; the damage from additional power plant emissions on these days tends to be 
exacerbated by the atmospheric conditions during these times, which are conducive to 
the formation of certain air pollutants, such as ozone (USEPA, 2006).   
Because of the higher profits that are available, it is assumed that the V2G 
participants are exclusively providing regulation for most days of the year.  That being 
said, it is assumed that the participants are always available to sell energy to the grid 
for the purpose of peak reduction.  In a sense, they will end up acting like a traditional 
peaking generator that only produces electricity when electricity demand is extremely 
high.  In reality, the times that PHEVs would be used to provide peak-reducing energy 
to the grid would ultimately be up to the grid operator or ISO, but for the purposes of 
this analysis, it is necessary to specify these times.  It will be assumed here that V2G is 
used for peak reduction only on ozone exceedance days.  Using this as a benchmark, 
the annual profits for a V2G participant in this type of program can be calculated.   
An ozone exceedance day is any day when the measured average ambient 
ozone concentration is above the federal standard (National Ambient Air Quality 
Standard) of 0.075ppm for an eight hour period or 0.12ppm during a single hour.  In 
this analysis, any day that registered an eight hour ozone exceedance at any of the 
New York Metropolitan Area monitoring stations (there are nine) is considered.  In 
2009, there were nine such ozone exceedance days in the New York Metropolitan 
Area: 26-Apr, 22-May, 7-June, 16-Jul, 10-Aug, 16-Aug, 17-Aug, 26-Aug, and 5-Sep.  
Additionally, there were 18 ozone exceedance days in 2008 and 11 in 2007 (NYDEC, 
2010).  In reality, using ozone exceedance days as a benchmark is only useful in 
retrospect.  If this type of program were to be actually implemented, a different system 
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that might use day-ahead air quality forecasts or even day-ahead electricity load 
forecasts would be required to signal for the use of V2G for peak reduction. 
 With specific days identified for the use of V2G for peak reduction, it is then 
possible to estimate the potential profits of a participant in this type of program.  The 
bulk of the profits still come from using V2G for frequency regulation during most of 
the year.  This means that the profits for these days can be computed exactly as they 
were before.  This, however, does not represent all of the profits from the market for 
regulation because it is possible for the participants to provide regulation even on the 
peak-reduction days up until the time that they sell their excess energy for the purpose 
of load reduction.  It is assumed here that the V2G participants will provide regulation 
on exceedance days from 6AM (the time the vehicle is assumed to be fully charged) 
until the time at which their excess energy will be sold to the grid.  As expected, the 
annual revenues and battery degradation costs are only slightly lower for the 
regulation component. 
 When calculating the profits associated with energy arbitrage, the revenues and 
costs for each of the exceedance days were calculated just as before, but only for the 
exceedance days instead of every day of the year. To calculate the cost of battery 
degradation, it was necessary to determine the electrical throughput during both peak 
reduction and regulation, and then multiply by the associated price.  Additionally, the 
fixed capital cost of $90 is taken into account in each scenario. 
 The last component to take into account is the capacity payment.  Because the 
vehicles would be available to supply energy to the grid year-round, there is no reason 
to believe that they would not be eligible for the full capacity payment as described 
previously.  In the type of program discussed here, the V2G participants would 
essentially be operating in the same manner as a peaking power plant.  Many of these 
peaking power plants do not operate for more than a few days throughout the year 
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(similar to this proposed V2G program).  It follows that a V2G program behaving in a 
similar manner as these peaking power plants would be eligible for similar 
compensation.  All of the components that go into the final profits in the dual-use V2G 
program are shown in Table 9-14, and the final annual profits for the proposed V2G 
program are shown in  
Table 15-17. 
 
Table 9: 2007 Dual-Use V2G Peak Reduction Profit Components 
Driver Group Energy 
Revenue 
Energy 
Cost 
Arbitrage 
Profits 
Battery Cost (Peak 
Component) 
Capacity 
Payment 
0 – 10 Miles $23 $5 $17 $5 $356 
10 – 20 Miles $16 $4 $12 $3 $252 
20 – 30 Miles $9 $2 $7 $2 $147 
30 – 40 Miles $4 $1 $3 $1 $64 
 
Table 10: 2007 Dual-Use V2G Regulation Profit Components 
Power Rating Regulation Revenue Battery Cost (Regulation Component) 
10kW $4521 $165 
1.33kW $603 $22 
 
Table 11: 2008 Dual-Use V2G Peak Reduction Profit Components 
Driver Group Energy 
Revenue 
Energy 
Cost 
Arbitrage 
Profits 
Battery Cost (Peak 
Component) 
Capacity 
Payment 
0 – 10 Miles $31 $13 $19 $8 $356 
10 – 20 Miles $22 $9 $13 $6 $252 
20 – 30 Miles $13 $5 $8 $3 $147 
30 – 40 Miles $6 $2 $3 $1 $64 
 
Table 12: 2008 Dual-Use V2G Regulation Profit Components 
Power Rating Regulation Revenue Battery Cost (Regulation Component) 
10kW $4373 $163 
1.33kW $538 $21 
 
Table 13: 2009 Dual-Use V2G Peak Reduction Profit Components 
Driver Group Energy 
Revenue 
Energy 
Cost 
Arbitrage 
Profits 
Battery Cost (Peak 
Component) 
Capacity 
Payment 
0 – 10 Miles $5 $2 $3 $4 $356 
10 – 20 Miles $3 $1 $2 $3 $252 
20 – 30 Miles $2 $1 $1 $2 $147 
30 – 40 Miles $1 $0 $1 $1 $64 
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Table 14: 2009 Dual-Use V2G Regulation Profit Components 
Power Rating Regulation Revenue Battery Cost (Regulation Component) 
10kW $2984 $165 
1.33kW $398 $22 
 
Table 15: 2007 Annual Profits - Dual Use V2G Program 
Driver Group Annual Profits – 10kW Annual Profits – 1.33kW 
0 – 10 Miles $4634 $859 
10 – 20 Miles $4525 $751 
20 – 30 Miles $4418 $643 
30 – 40 Miles $4332 $557 
 
Table 16: 2008 Annual Profits - Dual Use V2G Program 
Driver Group Annual Profits – 10kW Annual Profits – 1.33kW 
0 – 10 Miles $4486 $838 
10 – 20 Miles $4378 $730 
20 – 30 Miles $4270 $622 
30 – 40 Miles $4185 $537 
 
Table 17: 2009 Annual Profits - Dual Use V2G Program 
Driver Group Annual Profits – 10kW Annual Profits – 1.33kW 
0 – 10 Miles $3084 $641 
10 – 20 Miles $2979 $537 
20 – 30 Miles $2874 $432 
30 – 40 Miles $2792 $350 
 
 In a recent analysis, Jon Wellinghoff (Chairman of FERC) estimated the long 
run costs of owning several vehicle types (Wellinghoff, 2009).  The purpose of this 
analysis was to point out that the net present value of a "CashBack" PHEV (a PHEV 
used for V2G) can actually decrease over time.  Using estimated annual V2G profits 
of $1500, the net present value of the "CashBack" PHEV (which has much higher 
initial costs) dipped below all other types of automobiles (gasoline internal 
combustion included) after approximately four years.  Given the numbers presented 
here (in both the V2G-for-regulation and combined scenarios), it would take a slightly 
higher charge rate than the standard charge rate of the Chevrolet Volt to achieve the 
type of "CashBack" car presented in Wellinghoff's analysis.  Achieving a charge rate 
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sufficient to provide at least $1500 in annual profits seems to be very possible in the 
near future (though 10kW will likely take longer). The fact that a PHEV used for V2G 
could actually become less expensive than a traditional automobile after just a few 
years seems to be quite promising in terms of the near-term adoption of both PHEVs 
and V2G technology. 
 Along the same lines as Wellinghoff’s analysis, shown in Table 18 are the 
annual fuel costs of driving a gasoline internal combustion engine automobile 
(assuming a gasoline price of $3.00/gallon and 30mpg fuel efficiency) compared with 
the annual fuel cost (using 2008 electricity prices) of driving a PHEV with and 
without V2G (the profits used here are from the dual-use V2G program). 
 
Table 18: Annual Fuel Cost - Internal Combustion and PHEV Comparison 
Driver Group Avg. Daily 
Miles 
Driven 
Internal 
Comb-
ustion 
PHEV 
(No V2G) 
PHEV 
(1.33kW V2G) 
PHEV 
(10kW V2G) 
0 – 10 Miles 4.38 -$160 -$22 +$619 +$3062 
10 – 20 Miles 14.84 -$542 -$75 +$462 +$2904 
20 – 30 Miles 25.33 -$924 -$129 +$303 +$2745 
30 – 40 Miles 33.61 -$1227 -$171 +$179 +$2613 
40+ Miles 59.39 -$2168 -$910 N/A N/A 
 
 Notice in Table 18 that even in the case of PHEVs with no V2G technology 
being used that the annual fuel costs are drastically below that of a gasoline internal 
combustion automobile.  Additionally, notice that the annual fuel costs for PHEV 
drivers in the 40+ mile range increase dramatically; this is due to the fact that only the 
first 40 miles can be driven without the use of gasoline.  If V2G technology is taken 
into account, there are significant profits in place of the annual fuel costs, further 
reinforcing the idea that the use of PHEVs for V2G could increase the incentive for 
people to start switching away from internal combustion automobiles in the relatively 
near term. 
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 Back to the analysis at hand, notice in Tables 15-17 that some of the profits for 
the combined-use V2G program are actually higher than the profits for either single-
use program on their own in 2009. The reason that the profits are higher than the V2G 
for regulation program by itself is that the V2G system is only being used for peak 
reduction on a very limited number of days, and the additional capacity payment 
received more than makes up for the lost revenues that are experienced when the 
vehicles are being used for peak reduction rather than regulation. In 2007 and 2008, 
where there were more exceedance days, and thus more days where the V2G program 
was being used for peak reduction, the profits in the combined program are generally 
lower than the regulation-only program.   This is not necessarily a problem, however, 
since the profits only need to be high enough to incentivize people into participating in 
the program. In fact, with more days being used for peak reduction, the profits to the 
individual may be lower, but the external benefits could be higher.  An unexpected 
long-run problem is possible if the profits are actually too high, and too many people 
want to participate in the program.  The effects of high penetrations of PHEVs and 
high participation in a V2G program are discussed in Chapter III.  One of the effects 
of high PHEV penetration and V2G participation is that electricity prices will be 
altered.  In order to estimate these effects, an econometric model is necessary to 
predict the effect of changes in loads on electricity prices.  The model that predicts 
electricity prices is described in Chapter II. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Electricity Price Prediction Model 
 
The purpose of the model presented here is to estimate electricity prices given 
electricity loads and other factors that influence price.  This is done in a two step 
process where the first model predicts electricity loads, and then a second model is 
used to estimate electricity prices given the predicted loads from the first model.  The 
research presented here is based upon previous work by Jaeuk Ju (Ju & Mount, 2009) 
and Jung Youn Mo, who have each created similar models, though estimated in 
different ways.  The models that are presented here distinguish themselves mainly in 
the way that the hour of the day is taken into account.  The previous models were 
estimated either using average daily price and load data or using a single hourly time 
series to produce their results.  The models presented here, however, are specifically 
aimed toward taking the hour of the day into account.  One way of doing this would be 
to have a single model that has dummy variable for each hour of the day.  The 
approach taken here is to actually have twenty-four different models, each one 
representing a single hour of the day such that each observation in each of the sets of 
data represents one day.  Each set of models in the two-step process will be presented 
separately; the models that predict electricity load are presented first. 
 
Electricity Load Estimation 
 
 The data used to estimate this model contains two years (2007 and 
2008) of hourly data for the electricity load in New York City (NYISO, 2009b) as well 
as hourly local temperature data.   Because only one hour of each day will be used to 
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estimate each model, there are 731 observations for each model to be estimated (731 
because 2008 was a leap year). Before getting into a description of the data, it will be 
useful to have a simplified version of the model to use as reference.  The simplified 
model is presented as follow: 
 
Equation 4: Simplified Electricity Load Model Description 
                                                                               
                                                    
           
        
                                                  
 
 The dependent variable in this model is the natural log of electricity load in 
New York City at a given hour.  As discussed before, each period in the time series 
represents one day, and the electricity load is that of a single hour in that day.  This 
means that the value for Loadt-1 in each model is the previous day’s load at that hour, 
which is represented by LoadOne Day Lag in Equation 4.  Also included in the model is 
LoadOne Hour Lag, which is the electricity load on that day, at the previous hour.  For 
example, if in a particular observation Load represents the electricity load at 3:00 on 
Tuesday, LoadOne Hour Lag represents the load at 2:00 on Tuesday, and LoadOne Day Lag 
represents the load at 3:00 on Monday. 
 The first four measured independent variables in the model: cos(h), sin(h), 
cos(1), and sin(1)  are the seasonal variables in the model, where the first two are 
cosine and sine curves with half year cycles, and the second two are cosine and sine 
curves with full year cycles.  The reason that both cosine and sine curves are necessary 
here is that there are two periods in the year when load is substantially higher than 
normal. The period of highest increased demand is in the summer, when additional 
electricity is used for cooling, and the other period of increased demand is in the 
winter, when the load rises because of heating. Equation 5 describes how these 
variables are calculated.  Note that in the equations, t represents the number of the 
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time-series observation, where each observation is one day.  Additionally, note that the 
one-year seasonal variable is divided by 365.5 (and the half-year variable by 182.75) 
because of the fact that 2008 was a leap year.  The sine variables are calculated in 
exactly the same manner, with a sine function replacing the cosine function. 
 
Equation 5: Definitions for cos(1) and cos(h)  
 
            
     
     
  
 
            
     
      
  
 
 The next six variables in the model: mon, tues, wed, thur, fri, and sat are 
dummy variables, each representing a day of the week.  The variable that is left out 
represents Sunday, so that all of the coefficients on the other days will be comparing 
the electricity load on that day to the load on Sunday.  The next variable: hol is 
another dummy variable, which is set to one during all national holidays.   
 The last variables left to describe: CDD, HDD, CDD
2
, and HDD
2
 represent 
temperature, where CDD means cooling degree days and HDD means heating degree 
days.  Because of the nonlinear relationship between temperature and load, a simple 
measure of temperature cannot be used here.  It is assumed that any temperature below 
65˚F will be accompanied by additional heating demand, while any temperature above 
65˚F will be accompanied by additional cooling demand.  
  
Equation 6: Definitions for CDD and HDD 
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 Equation 6 describes how the CDD and HDD variables are calculated. With 
the variables defined this way, if the temperature were 75˚F at a particular observation, 
it would result in values of CDD = 10, and HDD = 0.  Alternatively, if the 
temperature were 55˚F, it would result in values of CDD = 0, and HDD = 10. 
Additionally, quadratic terms of each of these variables are included in the model.  
The reason for this is because as the difference between   (measured temperature) and 
65˚F increases, the load will likely increase at an increasing rate. 
 To expand on the simplified model shown above, the actual model to be 
estimated is specified as an ARIMA model.  In order to determine the orders of the 
Autoregressive and Moving Average processes, a measure of fit (Bayesian 
Information Criterion) is determined for 16 specifications of each of the 24 models.  
Table 19 shows the BIC for each of these specifications at the 0
th
 hour (12:00 
midnight). 
 
Table 19: Bayesian Information Criterion Results 
 
 This shows that the model achieved the greatest fit (minimum-BIC) at an 
AR(0)/MA(1) model specification.  Although this was not the minimum-BIC 
specification for every hour, it was the most common.   For this reason (and for the 
sake of continuity), the AR(0)/MA(1) specification is used to estimate all 24 hours.  
Note that because it is a 0
th
 order autoregressive model, it is no longer an ARIMA 
process, but a multiple variable MA(1) model.  The final version of the model is 
shown in Equation 7. 
MA↓ AR→ 0 1 2 3 
0 -5124.678 -5147.384 -5141.675 -5119.747 
1 -5148.903 -5142.358 -5135.951 -5137.249 
2 -5142.347 -5135.802 -5136.306 -5131.185 
3 -5119.553 -5136.905 -5131.649 -5125.094 
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Equation 7: Final Electricity Load Model Specification 
                                                                            
                                                    
           
        
                                                       
 
 Where εt = ut θut-1, and ut is a white noise residual uncorrelated with us            
 
Results: Load Estimation 
 
Because there are 24 different models being estimated here, it would be rather 
cumbersome to report all of the coefficients for each model; instead, graphs tracking 
the coefficients for each of several key variables will be presented (all of the 
coefficients and z-statistics are shown in the appendix).  Before getting into the 
individual variables, it will be useful to analyze a measure of fit.  Presented in Figure 3 
is a graph of the Bayesian Information Criterion (the same measure that was used for 
order selection). 
 
 
Figure 3: Bayesian Information Criterion (Load Estimation) 
 
The high negative values for the BIC are indicative of good fit.  The most 
interesting item to note about this graph is how the fit is best (highest negative value) 
during the hours of the day with relatively constant electricity demand; during the 
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hours with a lot of ramping (up or down), the fit decreases due to the increased 
difficulty in predicting electricity load.  The first and probably the most important 
variable that will be presented is the one hour lagged electricity load, shown in Figure 
4. 
 
 
Figure 4: One Hour Lagged Electricity Load 
 
The reason this variable is shown first is because it illustrates a problem that 
will persist throughout the rest of the analysis.  There are two hours (6:00AM and 
7:00AM) for which their one hour lagged electricity coefficients are greater than one; 
additionally, each has a root that is greater than one.  This suggests that observations 
that are farther in the past at these hours are actually more important than recent hours 
when it comes to predicting the electricity load.  Note that for these two hours, more 
complicated versions of the model were tested (with higher AR and MA orders), but 
none resulted in significant changes in the coefficients, and certainly none less than 
one.  Although that was not the result that was sought, it does act as a sort of 
robustness test for the models, implying that the model is not overly sensitive to 
changes in its specification. 
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Figure 5: One Day Lagged Electricity Load 
 
The variable shown in Figure 5 is the 24-hour lagged electricity load.  Again, 
there is some inconsistent behavior happening during the hours of 6:00AM and 
7:00AM, which is to be expected after looking at the results of the one-hour lagged 
load coefficients.  Both the one-hour and 24-hour lagged electricity variables show 
significance during most hours; the one-hour lagged variable has a minimum z-
statistic of 70.84 at 6:00AM, and has z-statistics well above 100 for most of the other 
hours.  The 24-hour lagged variable has a z-statistic close to 4 for most hours, though 
there are some hours (when the coefficient estimate is close to zero) that the z-statistic 
is very low, such as 10AM where the z-statistic was equal to 0.11).  This is merely 
because the variance stays relatively constant throughout the 24 hours, so it would be 
expected that when the coefficient estimate is near zero, low significance would be 
reported.  Figure 6 is a combination of the one-hour and the one-day lagged 
coefficients, it shows the one hour lagged coefficient plus the one day lagged 
coefficient, minus the product of the two.  For a single well behaved model one would 
expect that this value to be below one, which is what happens for the majority of the 
hours.  That being said, both the 6:00AM and 7:00AM values are above one, which 
further reinforces the suggestion that the models for these hours are not well behaved, 
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and are counting past values of electricity load as more statistically important than 
recent values. 
 
 
Figure 6:                     
 
 It is extremely important to keep in mind the anomalies at 6:00AM and 
7:00AM as the other variables are analyzed.  It is shown that the estimated coefficients 
at these hours are inconsistent with the other hours for each of the variables to be 
analyzed. Presented in Figure 7 are the estimated coefficients for the Wednesday, 
Saturday, and Holiday variables. 
 
Figure 7: Wednesday, Saturday, and Holiday Coefficients (Load Estimation) 
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 Though the only weekday variable that is shown here is Wednesday, it should 
be noted that all of the other weekday variables produced estimates that are extremely 
close together, such that choosing one of them provides a good representation of all of 
the weekday variables.  Additionally, though the coefficient estimates in Figure 7 
appear to be close to zero for many hours, the holiday variable and all of the day-of-
the-week variables show strong significance during almost every hour (except a small 
number of hours near when the coefficient estimates change sign). These variables 
behave generally as expected during most hours (recall that the day-of-the-week 
variables are compared being compared to Sunday). The weekday variables are 
positive during most of the hours associated with peak electricity demand, implying 
that electricity load is generally higher during these times on weekdays.  As for the 
holiday variable (which is set to one during holidays), the coefficient estimates are 
near zero or negative for most of the mid-day peak electricity hours, and then positive 
during the evening hours, which would likely be expected.  The coefficient estimates 
for the Saturday variable are a bit less understandable, as they predict lower electricity 
load for nearly the whole day.  The last set of variables to be analyzed in-depth are the 
cooling and heating degree variables.  Because both the unadjusted variable and the 
quadratic version of each variable were included, the coefficient estimates for each 
variable on their own do not reveal much; it is much more illuminating to analyze the 
net effect of the combination of each set of variables on electricity load. 
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Figure 8: Cooling Degree Day Net Effect on Load 
 
 
Figure 9: Heating Degree Day Net Effect on Load 
 
 The effects of cooling shown in Figure 8 behave in a way that is very logical, 
where the largest effects on electricity load occur during the hours when the work day 
tends to start, and in the hours when many people are coming home from work.  Note 
that because these are not coefficient estimates, they cannot be interpreted in the same 
manner.  For instance, the line in Figure 8 that represents a 30 degree cooling day 
shows what the effect on electricity load would be if it were 95 degrees at each 
specific hour.  This is the reason that it is logical to think the highest effect on load 
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would occur during an hour at the beginning of the work day: if it were 95 degrees at 
the beginning of the day, it is likely that people would want to increase their air 
conditioning more than if it were 95 degrees at the hours that typically have the 
highest temperature.  The heating degree effects shown in Figure 9 make slightly less 
sense for the 10, 20, and 30 degree effects, where the effect on electricity load is 
shown to be negative for many of the morning hours.  That being said, the effect of a 
50 degree heating day seems to make perfect sense for just about all of the hours 
(6:00AM and 7:00AM excluded). 
 While all of the estimated coefficients for each hour do not necessarily behave 
exactly as one would expect, they do behave well for the most part, which is about all 
that can be expected from a set of 24 econometric models.  The real test of the model 
does not come in the estimated coefficients themselves, but in the predictions of 
electricity load that are provided.  As a simple estimate of the predictive power of 
these models, the average difference between the predicted load and actual load was 
calculated to be approximately 0.219% (positive and negative differences offsetting), 
and 0.457% in absolute value. 
 
Electricity Price Estimation 
 
The model that is used to predict electricity prices is very similar to the load 
estimation model.  It is the same in that there are separate models estimated for each 
hour of the day, and it contains all of the same daily and seasonal variables. The 
variables that are not necessary in the price model are the variables that are based on 
temperature. Instead, there are new variables that represent the price of natural gas, 
which will be discussed in more detail below.  Additionally, the predicted loads from 
the first model are used as an input into the electricity price estimation model.  Finally, 
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the price estimation model is also an ARIMA model, though the model specification 
that resulted in the greatest fit for the greatest number of hours in this case is an 
AR(1)/MA(1) specification.  The model specification for the electricity price 
prediction model is shown in Equation 8. 
Equation 8: Final Electricity Price Model Specification 
 
                                                                             
                                                      
           
                                                               
 
Where εt  ρεt-1 + ut θut-1, and ut is a white noise residual uncorrelated with us         
  
 
 The only variables in Equation 8 that are left to be explained are NG1 and 
NG2.  These are the variables that represent the price of natural gas, which is a 
particularly important factor in determining the price of electricity in New York City, 
as many of the generators in the area are fueled by natural gas.  It is a reasonable 
assumption that the price of electricity is affected by both present and past values of 
natural gas; two weeks’ worth of lagged values of the price of natural gas are taken 
into account.   Instead of including a variable for each day in the two weeks of lagged 
prices, Lagrange interpolation polynomials are used to reduce the number of variables 
that need to be included in the model.  Furthermore, the Lagrange polynomials have 
the effect of smoothing the lag structure over the period of lagged values, which is 
likely much more realistic than the erratic lag structure that would most likely result 
from using a separate variable for each day in the period of lagged values.  To use the 
Lagrange interpolated polynomials in the econometric model, it is necessary to 
compute weighted sums of the natural gas prices for each observation.  These 
weighted sums for this model were computed on an hourly basis, such that a lagged 
value of (t – 336) is taken into account.  There are actually only 10 natural gas price 
observations (one for each weekday) in a two week period, so each of the other hourly 
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observations were interpolated.  In the calculations of the Lagrange interpolation 
polynomials, three base points were chosen (t = 0, t = 168, t = 336).  The polynomials 
for the lag structure and the weighted sums are calculated as in Equation 9 and 
Equation 10. 
 
Equation 9: Lagrange Interpolation Polynomials 
     
              
              
 
 
     
            
                
 
 
     
            
                
 
 
 
Equation 10: Lagrange Interpolation Weighted Sums 
                    
   
   
 
 
Three Lagrange interpolated weighted averages were calculated, but the third 
was dropped from the model, which has the effect of forcing the effect of the lag 
structure at the final lagged value to zero.  
 
Results: Price Estimation 
 
On the whole, the coefficient estimates for the price estimation model tend to 
be slightly more erratic than that of the load estimation model.  This likely has to do 
with the introduction of the model-predicted loads into the price model.  The 
coefficients in the price model tend to display the erratic behavior that was present at 
the hours of 6:00AM and 7:00AM in the load model.  Additionally, the same problem 
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that existed at those hours in the load model is present for two different hours in the 
price model. 
 
 
Figure 10: One Hour Lagged Electricity Price 
 
 The one-hour lagged electricity price coefficients shown in Figure 10 again 
reach a value greater than one during two hours, 1:00PM and 2:00PM.  To further 
analyze this, a combination of the one-hour and one-day lagged price coefficients were 
calculated (just as in Figure 6 for loads).  The result was exactly the same as it was in 
the load estimation: a graph that looks nearly identical to that of the one-hour lagged 
prices, and combined coefficient estimates greater than one at the same hour.  
Although this is the same problem that occurred in the load estimation, it appears to be 
less severe, as the coefficient estimates at these hours tend to be less anomalous than 
the estimates at 6:00AM and 7:00AM, even in the price estimation models. 
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Figure 11: Wednesday, Saturday, and Holiday Coefficient Estimates (Price 
Estimation) 
 
 Figure 11 shows the day-of-the-week and holiday coefficient estimates in the 
price estimation model.  The estimates shown here look very similar to those for the 
load estimation model, though slightly more erratic.  For example, in the weekday 
variables many of the estimates in the mid-day hours are negative, which is not to be 
expected.  Exactly the opposite is true for the holiday variable, which has positive 
coefficients during many of the mid-day hours where one would expect them to be 
negative.  An interesting note is that the mid-day hours where these variables behave 
as expected are the same hours in which the one-hour lagged price coefficient was 
greater than one.  Next, the variables unique to the price estimation model are 
analyzed. 
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Figure 12: NG1 and NG2 Coefficient Estimates 
 
 The coefficient estimates for the natural gas price variables are fairly erratic, 
though they are positive during most hours, which is to be expected.  While the other 
variables in this model tend to be statistically significant during most hours, the 
natural gas price variables show less significance.  The z-statistics for these variables 
were measured as greater than two during only three hours for each variable.  
Referring to Figure 12, those hours occur when the coefficient estimates spike in the 
positive direction.  The hours that are negative or near zero tend to show very little 
statistical significance (Hour 13 for NG1 excluded).  Despite the relatively low 
significance for these variables, it is very important to keep them in the model, as the 
price of natural gas is an extremely important factor in determining the price of 
electricity.  The last set of variables in the price model that will be analyzed here are 
the load variables.  Because both linear and quadratic versions of these variables were 
used, the net effect of a combination of the two variables will be presented instead of 
the coefficients of each variable on their own. 
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Figure 13: Net Effect of Electricity Load on Price 
 
Figure 13 shows the effect that electricity load has on price at loads of 
3000MW, 7000MW, and 12000 MW.  In this case, it is not necessarily the actual 
value of the effect on price that is important, but the difference between the values at 
different loads.  The fact that the effect on price is nearly identical for these three load 
levels suggests that there is a relatively weak effect of electricity load on price.  Figure 
13 is somewhat misleading because of the scale of the graph; recall that this effect is 
being applied to the natural log of electricity price, so that the difference between the 
load effects only has to be very small to have a substantial effect on the price of 
electricity.  There is indeed a noticeable effect of electricity load on price during 
individual hours, though the effect is slightly weaker than expected.  The variables that 
are found to be most important are the lagged electricity price variables, such that a 
change in load that is sustained over several hours will have a much greater effect on 
price than a change in load during a single hour. 
In the end, it was found that the price prediction model has slightly less 
predictive power than the load prediction model, but averaged throughout a year, the 
predicted price is still very close to the actual price.  In absolute value, the average 
difference was found to be approximately 11.07% between the actual and predicted 
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prices, but with positive and negative differences cancelling out throughout the year, 
the average difference was found to be only 0.36%. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
High Penetration Scenarios and the Impact of Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles and 
Vehicle-to-Grid Technology on Electricity Loads and Prices in New York City 
 
With higher levels of participation in a V2G program, there is potential to 
offset more peaking load or to provide a higher levels of regulation capacity, which is 
of course the goal of such a program.  The problem with high levels of participation, 
however, is that a decrease in the revenues to the individual participants is expected.  
This is true for either of the single-use V2G programs that have been discussed, and is 
thus true for the dual-use program that has been proposed.  The first of these to be 
discussed is the case of V2G for peak reduction.   
In the energy market, high levels of PHEV penetration will mean significantly 
increased load during charging periods, which will translate into increased prices and 
thus increased charging costs.  Additionally, high levels of V2G participation will 
mean significantly reduced load during peak hours, and decreased loads translate into 
decreased prices as well. Higher prices during charging and lower prices during 
vehicle-to-grid discharging translate into decreased profits from the energy market.  
 In order to estimate the effect of high penetrations of Plug-In Hybrid Electric 
Vehicles and high participation in a V2G program for peak reduction, the econometric 
model described in Chapter II is used along with load profiles for all 366 days (leap 
year) of 2008 that have been adjusted to represent the effect of increased use of 
PHEVs and V2G. 
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Load Adjustments 
 
The load adjustments employed here are based upon the figures presented in 
Table 1 and the estimate of 1,130,002 commuters into New York City on a daily basis 
(Sadik-Khan, 2007).  For the different penetration rates that are used, it is assumed 
that these rates apply to each driver group equally, such that at a 10% PHEV 
penetration rate, 10% of the drivers who exist within each group drive a PHEV.  To 
estimate the effect of PHEV charging on load, a regulated charging pattern is assumed, 
such that charging only takes place between 12:00AM and 6:00AM, which are the 
hours with the lowest electricity load (and highest vehicle availability).  Additionally, 
the charge rate during these six hours is assumed to be constant. 
 To estimate the change in load due to peak reduction supplied by V2G, it is 
necessary to use a V2G participation rate that is a part of the PHEV penetration rate.  
For example, if the PHEV penetration rate is 50%, and the V2G participation rate is 
50%, this implies that 25% of all vehicles are PHEVs that participate in the V2G 
program. It is assumed that the peak reduction always takes place during the hour that 
typically has the highest electricity load during weekdays in the summertime 
(4:00PM).  This criterion is used because these are the days that would be most 
obviously targeted for peak reduction.  The hour with the highest electricity load 
throughout the year is 5:00PM.  This difference in the hour of discharge only occurs in 
the cases with relatively low V2G participation, where peak reduction only takes place 
during a single hour.  With higher rates of V2G participation, the peak reduction is 
spread over several hours that typically have the highest electricity load.  In the case 
where peak reduction is spread over two hours, the reduction occurs during both 
4:00PM and 5:00PM.  Beyond the two hour reduction case, the additional hours of 
peak reduction typically occur before 4:00PM, since the average electricity load drops 
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fairly dramatically after 5:00PM.  Only in cases with extremely high penetration rates 
is the peak reduction spread over enough hours to include hours after 5:00PM.  Many 
of the hours during which the average electricity load is highest are commuting hours; 
for that reason, the amount of peak reduction that would occur at any hour is 
multiplied by the vehicle availability percentage at that hour. Figure 14 shows the 
changes to the average electricity loads in 2008 that are experienced by adjusting the 
daily load profiles to reflect the load conditions with various combinations of PHEV 
penetration and V2G participation. 
 
 
Figure 14: 2008 Adjusted Average Electricity Loads (NYC) 
 
 Notice in Figure 14 that the charging load in the 50% PHEV / 50% V2G case 
is lower than that of the 50% PHEV / 100% V2G case.  This is because the spare 
battery charge that is sold back to the grid during peak reduction needs to be charged 
as well, which means that increased V2G participation translates into additional 
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charging in addition to the peak reduction that is taking place. The next step in the 
analysis is to convert the changes in electricity loads into changes in electricity prices.  
 
Price Adjustments and Energy Market Profits 
 
The coefficient estimates from Chapter II are used along with the adjusted 
loads to create adjusted hourly estimates of the LBMP in New York City in 2008.  The 
same data that was used to estimate the econometric model is used here, and at each 
hour the value of each variable is set to its actual value at that time period.  The 
exceptions to this are the electricity load variables, which are adjusted according to the 
penetration rate of PHEVs and the V2G participation rate.  Some of the most dominant 
variables in the model are the lagged electricity prices. Because of this, the electricity 
prices are affected beyond the hour of changed load.  This resulted in a problem of 
overestimation due to the fact that the charging load at night can be extremely high, 
and have an effect on the prices for the rest of the day, and even the rest of the year.  
To remedy this problem, the dynamic price effect is stopped and restarted every day at 
7:00AM (after charging has taken place), so that the effect of peak load reduction on 
prices can be viewed on its own, without the influence of the higher prices at night. 
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Figure 15: 2008 Adjusted Average Electricity Prices (NYC) 
 
 Figure 15 shows the effect of various PHEV penetration and V2G participation 
scenarios on the New York City LBMP.  Using the models estimated here, the change 
in price at any individual hour is not necessarily on the same scale as the change in 
load at that hour.  Instead, a change in load at a single hour will have an effect on the 
price for many subsequent hours.  Although the price estimation presented here is 
likely an overestimation of this effect caused by model specification, it is likely that 
this dynamic price effect does exist to a degree in reality.  Because of the relatively 
weak single-hour effect of load on price, the changes in profits due to higher 
penetrations of PHEVs and higher participation in V2G are likely slight 
underestimates. 
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Table 20: Revenues, Costs, and Energy Arbitrage Profits – Unadjusted Predicted 
Prices (2008) 
Driver Group Revenues Costs Arbitrage Profits 
0 – 10 $334 $165 $170 
10 – 20 $236 $116 $120 
20 – 30 $138 $68 $70 
30 – 40 $60 $30 $30 
 
Table 21: Revenues, Costs, and Energy Arbitrage Profits – 25% PHEV / 25% 
V2G (2008) 
Driver Group Revenues Costs Arbitrage Profits 
0 – 10 $334 $171 $163 
10 – 20 $236 $120 $115 
20 – 30 $137 $70 $67 
30 – 40 $60 $31 $29 
 
Table 22: Revenues, Costs, and Energy Arbitrage Profits – 50% PHEV / 50% 
V2G (2008) 
Driver Group Revenues Costs Arbitrage Profits 
0 – 10 $331 $178 $153 
10 – 20 $234 $126 $108 
20 – 30 $136 $73 $63 
30 – 40 $59 $32 $27 
 
Table 23: Revenues, Costs, and Energy Arbitrage Profits – 50% PHEV / 100% 
V2G (2008) 
Driver Group Revenues Costs Arbitrage Profits 
0 – 10 $327 $181 $147 
10 – 20 $231 $128 $104 
20 – 30 $135 $74 $60 
30 – 40 $59 $32 $26 
 
 Table 20 shows the energy costs, energy revenues, and energy arbitrage profits 
using model predicted prices with unadjusted loads.  Notice that these (unadjusted 
price) figures differ from those in Chapter I.  This is in part because predicted prices 
are used instead of actual prices, though the difference between those price measures 
summed over the year is negligible.  The real difference arises because the 
calculations are slightly different; in the previous section it was assumed that the 
energy was discharged at the time of day with the maximum LBMP, whereas here it is 
 47 
assumed that energy is sold at 4:00PM in the unadjusted load scenario (this makes the 
revenue calculations in the adjusted scenarios manageable). Table 21-23 show the 
energy costs, revenues, and arbitrage profits for various penetration and participation 
scenarios.  In all of the adjusted load cases, the revenues are decreased, the costs are 
increased, and thus the profits are reduced as compared to the unadjusted scenario. 
 
High Participation and the Capacity Market 
 
In addition to decreased profits from energy arbitrage, participants in a 
program that uses V2G for peak reduction (or a combined program) would likely see 
reduced capacity payments with higher rates of participation. The capacity of the 
aggregated V2G program was defined as the amount of electricity load that can be 
reduced through the use of the V2G program.  With the hourly load data that has been 
used here, this means that if there is enough V2G capacity that the peak reduction can 
be spread over more than one hour, then the capacity for each participant in the V2G 
program will be reduced.  If real-time data were used (as might be used in an actual 
system), then a much smaller increase in the time scale of the peak reduction would 
result in decreasing marginal capacity.   
To give an idea of the magnitude of the reduction in capacity payment in terms 
of this study, the capacity payment for a V2G participant in the lowest mileage group 
(0 – 10 miles) was calculated to be $356.19 at 1% participation, where the peak 
reduction only occurs in only a single hour.  In the 50% PHEV penetration and 100% 
V2G participation scenario, the peak load reduction is spread evenly over 11 hours, 
implying that the capacity payment to that same individual would be reduced to 
$32.28. This severe reduction in capacity payment is mostly a symptom of the way the 
capacity of the V2G program is defined, and the manner in which the adjustments to 
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the peak load were made. In reality, it is unlikely that the load reduction would be 
spread evenly over several hours, which would mean that the amount of load reduced 
(in MW) during the hour with the very highest load would probably be greater. 
Furthermore, there exists no actual definition for the “capacity” of a storage system, 
which is essential to this type of analysis.  
 
High Participation and Regulation 
 
Along with V2G for peak reduction, there are potential problems with using 
V2G for regulation in high participation scenarios.  The problem lies in the fact that 
only a certain amount of regulation capacity is needed for the system.  In California, 
the regulation requirements range between 5% and 10% of the load at any given time 
(CAISO, 2001).  If this is applied to the New York City electricity market, which had 
an average load of 6062MW in 2009, then the amount regulation capacity needed 
would be on the order of 303MW to 606MW.  To fulfill 606MW worth of regulation 
capacity in the New York Metropolitan Area would require approximately 5.4% 
participation assuming a 10kW power rating, and 40.2% participation with a 1.33kW 
power rating.  If the amount of regulation capacity provided by the V2G service grows 
beyond the level that is required, then regulation prices will likely decrease sharply in 
a competitive market.  Alternatively, if prices were controlled, then many regulation-
providing generators and V2G participants would be crowded out of the market. 
 There are reasons to believe that there is more room for regulation-providing 
V2G participation than the numbers presented above suggest.  For example, it is likely 
the levels of V2G regulation capacity required will be higher than the amount of V2G 
regulation capacity that is used, in order to ensure reliability; note that this would also 
have the detrimental effect of reducing the profits to the individual participants.  It is 
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suggested in (Quinn, Zimmerle, & Bradley, 2010) that the amount of regulation 
capacity required would be approximately 2.49 times greater than the amount that 
would actually be used, which implies that the profits would be scaled back by an 
equivalent amount.  Additionally, the only ancillary service market that we have 
considered is regulation, but in truth there are other markets (such as the reserves 
market) in which a V2G service could make a valuable addition; with high rates of 
participation, the aggregated V2G service could participate in multiple markets.  
Furthermore, it is likely that there will be significantly increased demand for 
regulation, reserves, and storage in general due to higher penetrations of intermittent 
renewable energy sources such as wind and solar.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The results of the economic analysis presented here suggest that there is little 
financial incentive for PHEV owners to participate in a program that uses V2G 
technology solely for peak reduction.  On the other hand, there is significant potential 
for financial return for the participants when V2G technology is used for regulation.  
Though these two (and other) uses for V2G technology are most commonly viewed 
individually, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  A program that combines 
these two uses for V2G technology could provide similar profits for the driver to the 
V2G-for-regulation case, and additionally provide significant external benefits if it is 
used for peak reduction on days with extremely high electricity demand and pollution. 
With any of the uses for V2G technology that were described here, there exists 
a tendency for the revenues to decrease and costs to increase as the penetration of 
PHEVs and the participation in the V2G program increase. 
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It is likely that these and other problems could be alleviated with a different 
type of market structure. The analysis conducted here works within framework of the 
electricity markets that exist today, but perhaps what is actually needed is a 
completely different type of electricity market, specifically crafted for storage 
technologies.  If this were the case, then the participants in the program could be 
compensated through a payment mechanism (external to the many payment 
mechanisms discussed here) and the operators of the grid could determine the optimal 
use for the stored energy at any particular time. There is some additional evidence of 
this need in the California energy market, where Western Grid Development L.L.C. 
requested that its storage devices (batteries) be classified as wholesale transmission 
facilities and be eligible for rate-based regulation (Wellinghoff, Spitzer, & Norris, 
2010). This would most likely be unnecessary if there were a formal market for 
electricity storage.  With a market set up specifically for storage, the storage 
technologies (V2G included) could provide several services depending on the needs of 
the grid.  These services include peak shifting, regulation, reserves, and even services 
for which no market currently exists, such as ramping. With this type of storage 
market, the use of the stored energy could be optimized from the perspective of the 
grid operator, and with so many different uses for storage, the problem of reduced 
profits at high penetrations could be alleviated since the effect on any single market 
would be reduced. 
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APPENDIX  
Load Estimation Coefficients and Z-Statistics 
 
Hour Cos(1) Coeff Cos(1) Z Sin(1) Coeff Sin(1) Z Cos(h) Coeff Cos(h) Z Sin(h) Coeff Sin(h) Z Mon Coeff Mon Z 
0 -0.002 -1.76 -0.00209 -2.87 0.002732 5.08 0.003821 5.75 -0.00656 -6.41 
1 0.000149 0.18 -0.00056 -1.05 0.001255 3.15 0.002616 5.93 0.005314 6.68 
2 0.001408 2 -0.00011 -0.25 9.74E-05 0.27 0.001071 2.78 0.007077 12.32 
3 0.00182 3.42 -4.8E-05 -0.14 -9.2E-05 -0.35 0.000393 1.39 0.010455 24.97 
4 0.00168 2.92 -0.00037 -1.03 -7.7E-05 -0.27 0.000289 0.97 0.017516 37.7 
5 0.009638 7.71 -0.0009 -0.97 -0.00436 -6.67 0.001046 1.26 0.049829 41.17 
6 0.013174 5.86 0.003214 1.97 -0.00345 -2.81 -0.00562 -3.44 0.079788 33.03 
7 -0.00524 -2.95 0.005859 4.58 -0.00032 -0.36 -0.00606 -5.31 0.052958 25.12 
8 -0.00643 -5.55 0.000216 0.3 -0.00011 -0.2 -0.0013 -2.05 0.017362 13.46 
9 -0.00229 -2.75 -0.00069 -1.36 9.48E-05 0.26 -1.7E-05 -0.04 0.003939 3.19 
10 -0.00152 -2.06 -0.00112 -2.31 0.000861 2.48 0.001133 2.89 -0.00617 -5.84 
11 -0.00112 -1.66 -0.00153 -3.33 0.000577 1.85 0.000756 2.06 -0.00585 -6.02 
12 2.22E-05 0.03 -0.00129 -2.93 -1.6E-05 -0.05 0.000472 1.33 -0.00447 -4.64 
13 0.000246 0.46 -0.0011 -2.88 -0.00035 -1.2 -0.00025 -0.8 8.35E-05 0.08 
14 -0.00029 -0.54 -0.00108 -2.91 0.000372 1.35 2.31E-05 0.08 0.000782 0.86 
15 0.002207 3.04 -0.00201 -4.06 0.001584 4.18 -0.00048 -1.27 0.001966 2.03 
16 0.009795 10.1 -0.00377 -6.58 0.006308 12.71 -0.00323 -6.71 0.002812 2.22 
17 0.019831 17.95 -0.00262 -3.62 0.010579 16.48 -2.1E-05 -0.03 -0.00138 -1.03 
18 0.009412 5.87 -0.00107 -1.21 -0.00445 -4.36 0.004069 4.25 -0.01701 -10.48 
19 -0.00144 -0.97 -3.2E-05 -0.04 -0.01454 -17.98 0.002367 2.95 -0.01031 -9.31 
20 -0.01466 -11.36 0.004575 5.27 -0.00297 -4.14 0.000387 0.47 -0.01073 -9.48 
21 -0.01206 -14.27 0.000387 0.69 0.007321 16.59 0.000544 1.15 -0.01209 -16.19 
22 -0.00423 -4.44 -0.00154 -2.43 0.004012 8.39 0.002298 4.76 -0.01436 -18.36 
23 -0.00326 -3.14 -0.00206 -2.81 0.004212 7.29 0.004075 6.19 -0.01588 -17.27 
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Load Estimation Coefficients and Z-Statistics 
 
Hour Tue Coeff Tue Z Wed Coeff Wed Z Thur Coeff Thur Z Fri Coeff Fri Z Sat Coeff Sat Z 
0 -0.02128 -18.92 -0.02246 -20.15 -0.02175 -19.56 -0.01958 -18.41 -0.01228 -12.4 
1 -0.00059 -0.75 -0.00216 -2.89 -0.00138 -1.83 -0.00114 -1.46 -1.1E-05 -0.01 
2 0.004506 6.83 0.004081 6.33 0.004287 7.04 0.003436 4.72 0.001621 2.63 
3 0.008935 17.59 0.008182 16.81 0.008539 17.93 0.007646 15.93 0.00208 4.82 
4 0.015654 24.98 0.014701 25.88 0.014873 25.38 0.013802 23.74 0.003054 5.57 
5 0.052531 33.72 0.051429 33.49 0.051923 32.87 0.049481 31.41 0.009457 6.84 
6 0.096069 31.11 0.096013 30.48 0.096905 29.25 0.094505 29.48 0.023122 8.1 
7 0.073057 27.11 0.072768 28 0.074219 26.54 0.071513 26.86 0.028991 13.04 
8 0.025519 20.47 0.024515 18.85 0.026155 19.27 0.025415 18.82 0.017231 15.12 
9 0.005662 5.05 0.005995 6.2 0.005619 5.27 0.006054 6.04 0.007945 10.39 
10 -0.0093 -8.3 -0.00852 -8.54 -0.00866 -8.57 -0.00809 -8.1 -0.00124 -1.61 
11 -0.00618 -6.05 -0.00586 -6.19 -0.00587 -6.91 -0.00597 -6.65 -0.00413 -5.99 
12 -0.00402 -4.24 -0.00302 -3.33 -0.00302 -3.36 -0.00444 -5.18 -0.00572 -8.12 
13 0.002118 2.34 0.003229 3.65 0.003274 3.84 0.000239 0.3 -0.00509 -7.3 
14 0.002365 3.13 0.003268 4.23 0.003205 4.22 0.000054 0.07 -0.00367 -5.36 
15 0.003698 4.25 0.00381 4.51 0.004044 4.55 0.001418 1.63 -0.00243 -3.23 
16 0.005181 4.26 0.005311 4.4 0.00448 3.75 0.00113 1.01 -0.00249 -2.98 
17 -0.00228 -1.64 -0.00227 -1.69 -0.00484 -3.6 -0.00848 -6.72 -0.00515 -5.33 
18 -0.02307 -11.92 -0.02161 -11.79 -0.02383 -13.13 -0.0258 -13.97 -0.00564 -4.36 
19 -0.01378 -9.96 -0.01355 -9.75 -0.01491 -10.1 -0.01815 -13.12 -0.00618 -6.2 
20 -0.01255 -9.16 -0.01303 -9.8 -0.01457 -10.94 -0.01869 -14.3 -0.01171 -12.26 
21 -0.014 -16.31 -0.01421 -16.33 -0.01414 -16.48 -0.01569 -19.2 -0.00557 -7.73 
22 -0.01586 -17.52 -0.01493 -17.14 -0.01401 -16.66 -0.00827 -9.31 0.002365 3.06 
23 -0.01641 -14.34 -0.01586 -15.75 -0.0136 -13.14 -0.00159 -1.54 0.011372 13.2 
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Load Estimation Coefficients and Z-Statistics 
 
Hour Hol Coeff Hol Z CDD Coeff CDD Z CDDsq Coeff CDDsq Z HDD Coeff HDD Z HDDsq Coeff HDDsq Z 
0 0.013557 10.78 0.002342 10.67 -4.7E-05 -4.44 4.83E-05 0.4 6.26E-06 2.41 
1 0.005479 3.61 0.001214 6.19 -1.5E-05 -1.45 8.04E-05 0.83 4.56E-06 2.05 
2 -0.00577 -4.79 0.001014 6.03 -1.5E-05 -1.91 9.14E-05 1.09 2.67E-06 1.42 
3 -0.01046 -15.86 0.000565 4.12 -3E-06 -0.43 0.00002 0.31 3.08E-06 2.39 
4 -0.01374 -14.51 0.000303 1.9 -5.6E-06 -0.62 0.000103 1.54 5.23E-07 0.4 
5 -0.03909 -22.11 0.000548 1.23 -3.4E-05 -1.16 0.000195 1.44 -5.4E-06 -2.28 
6 -0.06503 -19.81 -0.00131 -1.6 1.22E-05 0.24 -0.00045 -1.95 -1.1E-06 -0.27 
7 -0.05132 -20.06 -0.00252 -5 0.000051 1.79 -0.00038 -1.92 -1.8E-06 -0.5 
8 -0.02552 -15.94 0.000449 1.64 -1.7E-06 -0.11 -0.00059 -4.37 8.69E-06 3.06 
9 -0.01044 -3.67 0.00168 10.55 -1.5E-05 -1.91 -0.00055 -5.99 1.11E-05 5.63 
10 0.002466 1.47 0.001679 12.67 9.18E-07 0.17 -0.00038 -4.65 9.67E-06 5.44 
11 0.004831 2.86 0.001434 13.99 1.23E-07 0.03 -0.00024 -2.89 6.22E-06 3.41 
12 0.001029 0.58 0.001207 10.99 -2.3E-06 -0.58 -0.00019 -2.26 4.88E-06 2.62 
13 -1.3E-05 -0.01 0.000894 9.03 -5.7E-08 -0.02 -0.00017 -2.04 4.39E-06 2.05 
14 -0.0001 -0.07 0.000798 8.01 -1.5E-06 -0.45 -8.6E-06 -0.1 8.09E-07 0.38 
15 -0.00297 -1.9 0.000618 4.47 3.39E-06 0.7 0.000104 1.25 -1.2E-06 -0.58 
16 -0.00275 -1.44 0.000447 2.57 7.84E-06 1.34 0.000515 4.6 -8.8E-06 -3.16 
17 0.002175 1.02 0.000156 0.64 2.69E-05 3.06 0.00044 3.62 -4.3E-06 -1.36 
18 0.012101 4.5 -0.00021 -0.73 4.76E-05 4.13 0.000131 0.79 9.34E-06 2.41 
19 0.009661 3.79 0.000781 3.15 1.43E-05 1.33 0.000436 2.76 -2.2E-06 -0.61 
20 0.012457 5.89 0.001332 6.23 2.85E-06 0.3 -6E-05 -0.47 7.18E-06 2.21 
21 0.010964 7.14 0.00202 13.46 -1.2E-05 -1.9 0.00021 2.07 1.52E-06 0.6 
22 0.010721 7.7 0.00196 10.04 -1.8E-05 -2.1 5.51E-05 0.47 5.6E-06 2.14 
23 0.006747 4.46 0.002273 10.03 -4E-05 -3.9 -7.1E-05 -0.6 9.32E-06 4.07 
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Load Estimation Coefficients and Z-Statistics 
 
Hour HourLag Coeff HourLag Z DayLag Coeff DayLag Z Cons Cons Z 
0 0.937767 120.01 0.024082 4.72 0.261832 4.85 
1 0.963618 134.58 0.010909 2.74 0.158988 3.84 
2 0.965634 159.29 0.010307 2.92 0.161531 4.7 
3 0.974152 215.3 0.001818 0.64 0.175924 6.96 
4 0.988861 206.55 -0.008 -2.59 0.146702 5.86 
5 0.977244 92.12 -0.01714 -2.17 0.336507 5.78 
6 1.017285 70.84 -0.0517 -4.45 0.318137 2.93 
7 1.077478 153.18 -0.06295 -9.41 -0.07484 -1.08 
8 0.979498 260.66 -0.03032 -7.8 0.495366 12.9 
9 0.951037 259.59 -0.01611 -5.07 0.614295 19.84 
10 0.934568 280 0.000361 0.11 0.603038 20.92 
11 0.949449 283.01 -0.00323 -1.06 0.490116 18.36 
12 0.968753 269.55 -0.00878 -2.91 0.358812 12.81 
13 0.988295 251.32 -0.01426 -5.12 0.227537 8.69 
14 0.990409 281.33 -0.01184 -4.46 0.184013 7.6 
15 0.988985 251.17 -0.01065 -3.16 0.186736 6.3 
16 0.982347 210.15 -0.01284 -3.51 0.26934 7.27 
17 0.94374 165.21 0.002199 0.49 0.480826 10.18 
18 0.906868 135.62 0.031383 4.43 0.537342 8.28 
19 0.914552 156.87 0.018427 3.37 0.578211 11.23 
20 0.898062 141.14 0.016632 3.21 0.739861 13.7 
21 0.91834 195.2 0.021765 5.4 0.498532 17.12 
22 0.923198 181.18 0.02787 6.59 0.381585 11.68 
23 0.925161 127.3 0.03131 5.88 0.309769 6.56 
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Price Estimation Coefficients and Z-Statistics 
 
Hour Cos(1) Coeff Cos(1) Z Sin(1) Coeff Sin(1) Z Cos(h) Coeff Cos(h) Z Sin(h) Coeff Sin(h) Z Mon Coeff Mon Z 
0 0.077504 5.84 0.026948 1.96 -0.00754 -0.67 -0.00668 -0.52 -0.04985 -3.99 
1 0.056635 4.86 0.044074 3.69 -0.01105 -1.21 -0.01405 -1.46 0.012628 1.34 
2 0.021905 1.53 0.022224 1.59 0.007941 0.68 0.002181 0.19 0.005349 0.79 
3 0.030187 4.51 -0.00776 -1.18 -0.00816 -1.68 0.001953 0.38 0.025884 4.5 
4 -0.00161 -0.42 0.009467 2.95 -0.00289 -0.95 0.001604 0.49 0.030927 5.45 
5 0.043869 3.12 0.013093 1.02 -0.04122 -3.67 -0.01419 -1.22 0.12292 14.96 
6 0.097713 7.57 0.013081 1 -0.06051 -5.23 -0.03311 -2.78 0.202116 15.41 
7 -0.03114 -2.08 0.062727 4.07 0.031922 2.54 -0.02165 -1.63 0.11692 8.03 
8 -0.02812 -4.33 0.018924 2.92 0.00648 1.3 -0.00168 -0.31 0.013991 1.24 
9 -0.01753 -3.18 0.002899 0.56 -0.00331 -0.82 0.007355 1.72 -0.01316 -1.26 
10 -0.01123 -3.34 0.004518 1.44 0.009066 3.51 0.001463 0.57 -0.02296 -3.02 
11 -0.02696 -4.87 -0.00344 -0.62 0.006018 1.38 -0.00425 -0.97 -0.01855 -2.76 
12 -0.03107 -8.12 -0.00857 -2.46 0.002107 0.84 -0.00109 -0.39 -0.01464 -2.09 
13 -0.03316 -7.01 -0.01446 -3.14 0.00249 0.71 -0.00349 -0.89 -0.0005 -0.09 
14 -0.02906 -6.09 -0.01114 -2.59 0.005058 1.53 0.012644 3.25 0.003653 0.57 
15 -0.00558 -1.06 -0.01293 -2.51 0.012915 3.21 0.003228 0.73 0.01354 1.95 
16 0.063437 13.69 0.00103 0.22 0.037243 9.44 -0.02326 -6.05 -0.02513 -2.22 
17 0.11312 15.7 0.035849 4.67 0.038551 5.68 0.006812 1.08 -0.0253 -3.23 
18 0.061174 5.93 0.030686 3.19 -0.04365 -4.88 0.001129 0.12 -0.02867 -3.86 
19 -0.01549 -1.53 0.010209 0.96 -0.04829 -5.58 -0.01779 -1.81 -0.01536 -2.63 
20 -0.06402 -3.49 0.050919 3.05 0.001077 0.07 -0.00877 -0.66 -0.02133 -3.17 
21 -0.02262 -2.55 -0.00264 -0.36 0.02163 3.25 0.005169 0.73 -0.02354 -3.82 
22 0.019905 2 -0.01961 -2.21 0.007201 0.9 0.000331 0.04 -0.01489 -1.72 
23 0.042763 3.44 0.00387 0.34 -0.01726 -1.71 -0.00271 -0.24 -0.01433 -1.29 
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Price Estimation Coefficients and Z-Statistics 
 
Hour Tue Coeff Tue Z Wed Coeff Wed Z Thur Coeff Thur Z Fri Coeff Fri Z Sat Coeff Sat Z 
0 -0.0669 -4.77 -0.06934 -5.42 -0.06347 -4.97 -0.05358 -4 0.003158 0.27 
1 0.012666 1.43 -0.0018 -0.21 0.002738 0.29 0.009807 1.08 0.000175 0.02 
2 0.008311 1.16 -0.00053 -0.07 0.007259 0.98 3.24E-03 0.44 -0.00186 -0.29 
3 0.01886 3.38 0.014709 2.85 0.021438 4.35 0.010718 2.16 0.009485 1.88 
4 0.040068 6.36 0.034633 5.51 0.035483 5.72 0.031527 4.98 0.004505 0.77 
5 0.114912 12.38 0.118236 13.14 0.121847 13.64 0.123117 13.58 0.018854 2.2 
6 0.193279 13.82 0.202871 14.25 0.197608 14.03 0.183347 13.29 0.026266 2.42 
7 0.075302 5.09 0.071319 5.04 0.073073 5.39 0.084465 6.12 0.014529 1.28 
8 -0.02211 -1.99 -0.02993 -2.78 -0.03329 -3.01 -0.02293 -2.07 0.014643 1.87 
9 -0.03225 -3.37 -0.04278 -4.32 -0.03537 -3.63 -0.03653 -3.7 -0.00434 -0.64 
10 -0.04452 -5.91 -0.03191 -4.46 -0.04604 -5.98 -0.03918 -5.22 -0.01392 -2.91 
11 -0.02115 -3.22 -0.02007 -3.27 -0.02258 -3.5 -0.01898 -2.94 -0.01619 -3.69 
12 -0.02619 -3.74 -0.02132 -2.97 -0.02022 -2.9 -0.02398 -3.49 -0.01775 -3.73 
13 -0.00052 -0.09 0.006447 1.1 0.002084 0.35 -0.00201 -0.35 -0.01554 -3.44 
14 0.006041 0.95 0.000766 0.12 0.003266 0.52 0.00451 0.72 -0.00034 -0.07 
15 0.011767 1.73 0.003074 0.47 -1.8E-05 0 -6.4E-05 -0.01 0.000797 0.15 
16 -0.03168 -2.76 -0.03179 -3.08 -0.03529 -3.22 -0.05207 -4.85 -0.02297 -3.46 
17 -0.03707 -4.09 -0.04609 -5.26 -0.0432 -4.63 -0.04505 -5.29 -0.03897 -6.13 
18 -0.04836 -5.99 -0.04909 -6.29 -0.04383 -5.57 -0.04973 -6.74 -9.2E-06 0 
19 -0.02539 -4.6 -0.02654 -4.75 -0.02462 -4.02 -2.87E-02 -5.13 -0.02181 -4.59 
20 -0.0197 -2.64 -0.01911 -2.59 -0.02442 -3.27 -0.02275 -3.7 -0.01932 -3.76 
21 -0.03019 -4.3 -0.02649 -3.76 -0.0295 -3.97 -0.02763 -4.27 -0.01141 -1.9 
22 -0.01931 -2.22 -0.01797 -1.98 -0.01722 -1.79 -0.00943 -1.13 0.009999 1.36 
23 -0.01831 -1.58 -0.01848 -1.63 -0.00104 -0.09 0.012065 1 0.02413 2.15 
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Price Estimation Coefficients and Z-Statistics 
 
Hour Hol Coeff Hol Z NG1 Coeff NG1 Z NG2 Coeff NG2 Z Load Coeff Load Z Loadsq Coeff Loadsq Z 
0 -0.02273 -0.87 0.000493 2.3 0.000618 4.4 0.995665 0.19 -0.0226 -0.08 
1 -0.05614 -2.81 5.66E-05 0.29 0.00018 1.88 -1.33489 -0.49 0.086845 0.55 
2 -0.03576 -1.63 9.77E-06 0.08 2.73E-05 0.47 1.743977 0.87 -0.09904 -0.85 
3 -0.00228 -0.27 0.000147 1.31 4.56E-06 0.08 2.732301 1.91 -0.16104 -1.93 
4 -0.01777 -2.02 5.03E-05 0.51 3.69E-06 0.07 0.23555 0.16 -0.01749 -0.2 
5 -0.14005 -10.79 -0.00011 -0.6 6.35E-05 0.66 2.696072 1.07 -0.15423 -1.05 
6 -0.17155 -7.41 0.00037 1.76 0.000222 1.94 12.6738 5.48 -0.72204 -5.43 
7 -0.08738 -3.7 0.000458 1.89 -6.1E-05 -0.52 0.274716 0.16 -0.00175 -0.02 
8 0.002102 0.14 0.000194 0.87 0.000151 1.49 2.423996 1.9 -0.1336 -1.84 
9 0.026697 1.59 5.61E-05 0.34 -3.1E-05 -0.41 -1.44121 -1.17 0.079672 1.14 
10 0.035573 2.92 -2.3E-05 -0.29 0.000132 3.49 0.320917 0.36 -0.01118 -0.23 
11 0.018194 2.11 0.000178 1.38 -4.6E-05 -0.75 -2.1577 -3.1 0.127871 3.3 
12 0.005483 0.33 -1.7E-05 -0.15 -5.3E-05 -1.08 -2.1335 -2.26 0.12691 2.4 
13 0.021142 2.38 -0.00021 -2.46 4.07E-05 0.93 -1.47845 -2.14 0.09239 2.4 
14 -0.01215 -1.04 -3.1E-05 -0.36 -4.5E-06 -0.11 -3.79139 -4.99 0.217974 5.14 
15 -0.00386 -0.34 5.67E-05 0.63 4.88E-05 1.23 -1.88721 -2.25 0.113913 2.42 
16 0.025794 1.22 0.000191 1.17 1.93E-07 0 -4.00644 -2.68 0.236319 2.82 
17 0.008601 0.5 0.000154 1.56 9.77E-05 1.92 -2.1941 -1.58 0.12818 1.64 
18 0.019717 1.52 0.000128 0.93 0.000146 2.18 2.664615 1.89 -0.1475 -1.86 
19 -0.0009 -0.05 -3.5E-06 -0.03 4.89E-05 0.86 1.186314 0.74 -0.06909 -0.77 
20 -0.00576 -0.28 -2E-05 -0.12 0.000107 1.28 3.243884 1.54 -0.17858 -1.5 
21 0.024287 1.04 0.000141 1.11 -5.8E-07 -0.01 5.741009 2.93 -0.31891 -2.89 
22 0.045316 1.82 7.26E-05 0.32 6.19E-05 0.61 3.505462 1.12 -0.18781 -1.06 
23 -0.04584 -1.7 0.000536 2.53 6.56E-05 0.6 3.434288 0.73 -0.1736 -0.64 
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Price Estimation Coefficients and Z-Statistics 
 
Hour HourLag Coeff Hourlag Z DayLag Coeff DayLag Z Cons Cons Z 
0 0.403381 10.83 0.130635 2.48 -5.3077 -0.24 
1 0.846866 38.92 0.09477 4.72 5.112479 0.43 
2 0.879589 54.48 0.088033 5.69 -7.63045 -0.88 
3 0.944429 80.33 0.041204 3.46 -11.6083 -1.89 
4 0.929181 77.74 0.043097 3.41 -0.65868 -0.1 
5 0.865624 42.49 0.04326 2.26 -11.4054 -1.05 
6 0.748009 34.5 0.026435 1.13 -54.7976 -5.45 
7 0.739454 34.93 0.085253 3.95 -1.53816 -0.2 
8 0.761492 48.28 0.088808 5.07 -10.3257 -1.86 
9 0.905167 61.12 0.062507 3.93 6.753045 1.25 
10 0.856634 70.72 0.048919 4.33 -1.53088 -0.39 
11 0.933603 83.22 0.025948 2.11 9.279135 2.97 
12 0.965925 80.89 0.025395 1.98 9.021348 2.15 
13 1.016813 83.57 -0.0102 -0.96 5.850113 1.89 
14 1.025189 92.21 0.002493 0.25 16.34976 4.8 
15 0.963205 82.59 -0.00138 -0.13 7.929075 2.12 
16 0.855162 59.39 0.060515 4.17 17.3723 2.6 
17 0.806399 54.36 0.080459 5.65 9.898811 1.6 
18 0.82303 50.51 0.066776 4.23 -11.6041 -1.85 
19 0.883222 61.04 0.045589 2.92 -4.77991 -0.67 
20 0.866248 53.61 0.013243 0.75 -14.2127 -1.52 
21 0.880643 55.59 0.079139 4.87 -25.7307 -2.96 
22 0.908739 39.92 0.098409 5.37 -16.4747 -1.2 
23 0.652321 28.37 0.173944 5.8 -16.2 -0.78 
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